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INTRODUCTION 
 
Freedom of religion or belief and school education is a multifaceted 
issue that entails significant opportunities and far-reaching challenges. The 
school is the most important formal institution for the realization of the right 
to education. It provides a place of learning, social development and social 
encounter. At the same time, the school is also a place in which authority is 
exercised and some individuals, including members of religious or belief 
minorities, may find themselves in situations of vulnerability. Given this 
ambivalence  of  the  school  environment,  safeguards  to  protect  the 
individual‘s right to freedom of religion or belief are necessary1. 
Schools  can  offer  unique  possibilities  for  constructive  dialogue 
among all members of society, and human rights education in particular can 
contribute to the elimination of negative stereotypes that often adversely 
affect  members  of  religious  minorities.  However,  freedom  of  religion  or 
belief and school education has also sparked controversy in many societies, 
particularly with regard to contentious issues such as religious symbols in 
the school context and religious instruction2. 
The role of religious symbols, including wearing religious garments 
in school and religious education, has been, and continues to be, a matter of 
controversy in a number of countries. Pupils/students or teachers/professors 
observing religious dress code, including Islamic headscarves and Sikh 
turbans, have in some countries been expelled from schools, denied access 
to higher education, suspended from their jobs or had other rights restricted. 
Parents and (or) children seeking to benefit from the exemptions from 
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religious classes are forced to reveal their belief or the fact that they are non-
believers that raises concerns about the proper implementation of the Article 
9 ECHR and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on 
Human rights (hereinafter ECHR or the Convention). 
So far, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR or 
the Court) has dealt with diverse forms of religious symbols. The relevance 
of  the  issue  is  demonstrated  by  the  new  applications  raising  new  issues 
concerning the display/wearing of religious symbols. And, as the President 
of the Strasbourg Court Sir Nicolas Bratza indicated: ‘this may be far from 
the Court’s last word on the question of the wearing of religious dress or 
symbols.’3 
Furthermore, the decisions delivered by the ECtHR against Norway, 
Turkey and Poland showed that not all Member States of the Council of 
Europe are ready to ensure education and teaching consistent with parents‘ 
religious and philosophical convictions. As the legal regulation related to 
the content of subjects and the curriculum of classes itself is in constant 
change,  the  question  of  educational  standards  consistent  with  religious 
freedom remains acute. 
Thus, the main purpose of this article is to discover what criteria are 
applicable to the content of teaching, i.e. the teaching of religion classes, 
subjects having religious content and (or) alternative subjects, and to what 
extent the usage of religious symbols is permitted in educational institutions. 
To this end, the authors will analyze: 1) the application of Article 9 of the 
Convention and Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR in the field at issue; 2) 
the requirements set for education and teaching consistent with their own 
religious  and  philosophical  convictions;  3)  the  extent  of  the  margin  of 
appreciation of states in the prohibition (limitation) on the use of religious 
symbols. 
 
 
I.  EDUCATION CONSISTENT WITH RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS 
 
The legal regulation and values guiding education in European states 
have developed in the light of ECtHR’s practice in interpreting Article 9 of 
the ECHR and Article 2 of Protocol  No. 1 of the ECHR4. As has been 
mentioned above, in a number of cases the Court reiterated that freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, as enshrined in Article 9, entails,  inter 
alia, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practice or not to 
practice a religion5, including the right of individuals not to be required to 
reveal their faith or religious beliefs and not to be compelled to assume a 
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stance from which it may be inferred whether or not they have such beliefs6. 
The  Court  accepted  that  Article  9  was  also  a  precious  asset  for  non -
believers: there would be an interference with the negative aspect of this 
provision when a state brought about a situation in which individuals were 
obliged – directly or indirectly – to reveal that they are non-believers7. This 
is all the more important when such obligations occur in the context of 
education, where Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, which is regarded as  lex 
specialis in relation to Article 9 of the ECHR, comes into play8. 
Under the well-established jurisprudence of the ECtHR, Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1 does not permit a distinction to be drawn between religious 
instruction  and  other  subjects.  It  enjoins  a  state  to  respect  parents’ 
convictions, be they religious or philosophical, throughout the entire State 
education programme9. That duty is broad in its extent as it applies not only 
to the content of education and the manner of its provision but also  to the 
performance of all the ‘functions’ assumed by a state. The verb ‘respect’ 
means  more  than  ‘acknowledge’  or  ‘take  into  account’.  The  term 
‘conviction’, taken on its own, is not synonymous with the words ‘opinions’ 
and  ‘ideas’.  It  denotes  views  that  attain  a  certain  level  of  cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance10.  
Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that by binding themselves not to 
‘deny the right to education’, the states guarantee to anyone within their 
jurisdiction a right of access to educational institutions existing at a given 
time and the possibility of drawing, by official recognition of the studies 
which he has completed, profit from the education received11. It is in the 
discharge of a natural duty towards their children  – parents being primarily 
responsible for the ‘education and teaching’ of their children – that parents 
may require a state to respect their religious and philosophical convictions. 
Their  right  thus  corresponds  to  a  responsibility  closely  linked  to  the 
enjoyment and the exercise of the right to education12. 
However, the setting and planning of the curriculum fall in principle 
within the competence of the States13. In particular, the second sentence of 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not prevent States from imparting through 
teaching or education information or knowledge of a directly or indirectly 
religious or philosophical kind. It does not even permit parents to object to 
the integration of such teaching or education in the school curriculum, for 
otherwise  all  institutionalized  teaching  would  run  the  risk  of  proving 
impracticable14. On the other hand, the second sentence of Article 2   of 
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Protocol No. 1 implies that a state, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it 
in  regard  to  education  and  teaching,  must  take  care  that  information  or 
knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical 
and  pluralistic  manner.  The  State  is  forbidden  to  pursue  an  aim  of 
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious 
and philosophical convictions15. 
Due to the guidelines on the implementation of the right to education 
consistent with religious conviction s formulated mainly by the ECtHR, 
national  jurisdictions  have  faced  a  number  of  changes  in  the  legal 
regulation. Religious education in Europe has been closely tied in with 
secular  education.  In  most  states  religious  education  forms  a  part  of 
secondary  school  curriculum,  with  exemptions  provided  from  religion 
classes or alternatives provided. 
Of the 46 Member States of the Council of Europe, 43 provide 
religious education classes in state schools. Only Albania, France (with the 
exception  of  the  Alsace  and  M oselle  regions)  and  Macedonia  are  the 
exceptions to this rule. In Slovenia, non-confessional teaching is offered in 
the last years of state education16. In 25 of the 46 Member States (including 
Turkey), religious education is a compulsory subject. However, the scope of 
this obligation varies depending on the State. In five countries, namely 
Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden and Turkey, the obligation to attend 
classes in religious education is absolute.  All pupils professing particular 
religion are obliged to  partial or full extent to attend religious classes. 
However, ten States allow for exemptions under certain conditions. This is 
the  case  in  Austria,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Liechtenstein, 
Malta, Monaco, San Marino and the United Kingdom. In the m ajority of 
these countries, religious education is denominational17.  
Ten other countries give pupils the opportunity to choose a substitute 
lesson in place of compulsory  religious education. This is the case in 
Germany,  Belgium,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Lux embourg,  the 
Netherlands,  Serbia,  Slovakia  and  Switzerland.  In  those  countries, 
denominational education is included in the curriculum drawn up by the 
relevant ministries and pupils are obliged to attend unless they have opted 
for the substitute lesson proposed18. In contrast, 21 Member States do not 
oblige pupils to attend classes in religious education. Religious education is 
generally authorized in the school system but pupils only attend if they have 
made a request to that effect. This is the case in the largest group of States: 
Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Spain, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. Finally, in a third group of States, 
pupils are obliged to attend a religious education or substitute class19. 
The general overview of religious education in Europe shows that, in 
spite of the variety of teaching models, almost all Member States offer at 
least one route by which pupils can opt out of  religious education classes 
(by providing an exemption mechanism or the option of attending a lesson 
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in a substitute subject, or by giving pupils the choice of whether or not to 
sign up to a religious studies class)20. However, the choice itself does not 
guarantee that the Member States ensure in practice an education consistent 
with religious convictions in line with the requirements set forth explicitly 
and implicitly in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the ECHR. 
Taking into account the legal regulation existing in the states, there 
are several situations relevant to the question of education consistent with 
religious  convictions  which  must  be  distinguished  and  analyzed:  (a) 
obligatory instruction in a particular religion or belief or subjects i nvolving 
religious elements; (b) attending lessons in a substitute subject unrelated to 
religion; (c) coercive participation in classes of a certain type that, by their 
nature,  have  potential  for  generating  discussion,  particularly  in  very 
religious families.  
Obligatory instruction in a particular religion or belief or subjects 
involving religious elements, such as a course in the general history of 
religions and ethics, has been discussed before the ECtHR in a number of 
cases.  Interpreting  the  right  to  an   education  consistent  with  religious 
convictions, the ECtHR has consistently reiterated that under Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1 it remained, in principle, within the national margin of 
appreciation  left  to  the  States  to  decide  whether  to  provide  religious 
instruction in public schools and, if so, what particular system of instruction 
had to be adopted21. Nevertheless, a state was forbidden to pursue an aim of 
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents' religious 
and philosophical convictions22.  
To examine the compliance of national legal regulations with this 
aim, the ECtHR has developed a two -step system. First of all, the Court 
analyzes whether the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and 
pluralistic manner. Priority being given to knowledge of one religion cannot 
itself  be  viewed  as  a  departure  from  the  principles  of  pluralism  and 
objectivity which would amount to indoctrination, having regard to the fact 
that, notwithstanding the State's secular nature, a particular religi on is the 
majority religion practiced in the state. It could be considered as remaining 
within acceptable limits for the purposes of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as 
long  as,  as  has  been  mentioned,  the  information  or  knowledge  in  the 
syllabus is disseminated in an objective, critical and pluralist manner23.  
Secondly, where a state includes religious instruction amounting to 
indoctrination in the curriculum for study, it is then necessary, insofar as 
possible, to avoid a situation in which pupils face a confli ct between the 
religious education given by the school and the religious or philosophical 
convictions of their parents by providing an exemption mechanism or the 
option of attending a lesson in a substitute subject, or by making attendance 
at religious studies classes entirely optional24. Recent cases decided before 
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the ECtHR, Folgerø and Others v. Norway25 and Hasan and Eylem Zengin 
v. Turkey26, demonstrated a lack of pluralism and objectivity in a religious 
education and did not avoid the conflict between religious education and the 
religious convictions of parents. 
In the Folgerø and Others case the Court reviewed, under Article 2 
of  Protocol  No.  1,  the  arrangements  for  a  compulsory  subject  in 
Christianity,  Religion  and  Philosophy  taught  during  the  ten  years  of 
compulsory schooling in Norway. Besides the curriculum of the subject, 
which was dominated by a preponderance of Christianity, the Court took 
into account the legal provisions of the 1998 Education Act that aimed at 
helping to give pupils a Christian and moral upbringing during primary and 
lower  secondary  education,  and  concluded  that  the  course's  curriculum 
failed  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  pluralism  and  objectivity. 
Furthermore, the Court went on to analyze whether a partial exemption from 
the  subject  ensured  consistency  between  the  religious  education  and  the 
religious convictions of the applicants, coming to the conclusion that it did 
not.  The  Court  took  into  account  that,  first  of  all,  parents  could  face 
difficulties in identifying the parts of the teaching that they considered as 
amounting  to  the  practice  of  another  religion  or  adherence  to  another 
philosophy of life; secondly, the requirement to give reasonable grounds in 
the  request  for  the  exemption  created  a  risk  that  the  parents  might  feel 
compelled  to  disclose  intimate  aspects  of  their  own  religious  and 
philosophical convictions to the school authorities taking a decision; thirdly, 
the parental note requesting partial exemption did not necessarily mean that 
the pupil concerned would be exempted from the part of the curriculum27. 
In the Hasan and Eylem Zengin case the ECtHR concluded that the 
instruction  provided  in  the  school  subject  ‘religious  culture  and  ethics’, 
whose  title  made  it  seem  neutral,  could  not  be  considered  to  meet  the 
criteria  of  objectivity  and  pluralism,  nor  did  it  respect  the  religious  and 
philosophical convictions of the applicant, a follower of the Alevi faith. The 
Court  concluded  that  the  religious  diversity  which  prevailed  in  Turkish 
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society was not taken into account as pupils received no teaching on the 
confessional or ritual specificities of the Alevi faith, although the proportion 
of the Turkish population belonging to it is very large. Furthermore, there 
were no appropriate means  to  ensure  respect  for parents'  convictions, as 
only children of Turkish nationality who belonged to the Christian or Jewish 
religions  had  the  option  of  exemption,  provided  they  affirmed  their 
adherence  to  those  religions,  revealing  their  religious  beliefs  and 
convictions28. 
The  ECtHR’s  position  in  this  and  other  cases  clearly  shows  that 
Turkey and other countries with the same system of virtuous education must 
either stop making religious classes compulsory (by exemption or giving 
alternatives)  or  must  ensure  that  the  syllabus  treats  all  belief  systems 
equally. However, in recent discussions in Turkey, experts have expressed 
the view that the latter is virtually impossible29. 
The subjects that form a part of virtuous education as an alternative 
to religious classes, e.g. ethics, have also been the subject of discussions 
before the ECtHR. In  Grzelak v. Poland the applicant complained of the 
discriminatory  nature  of  the  non-provision  of  courses  in  ethics  and  the 
resultant absence of a mark for ‘religion/ethics’ on his school reports. The 
parents of the applicant systematically requested the school authorities to 
organize classes in ethics for him, as provided for in the Ordinance of the 
Minister  of  Education  of  13  July  2007.  However,  no  such  classes  were 
organized for the applicant throughout his entire schooling at primary and 
secondary level due to the lack of sufficient numbers of pupils interested in 
attending such a class. 
The Court took the view that the provisions of the Ordinance of the 
Minister of Education of 13 July 2007, which provided for a mark to be 
given  for  ‘religion/ethics’  on  school  reports  could  not,  as  such,  be 
considered to infringe Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 of the 
Convention as long as the mark constituted neutral information on the fact 
that a pupil had followed one of the optional courses offered at a school. 
However,  the  ECtHR  decided  that  a  regulation  of  this  kind  had  also  to 
respect the right of pupils not to be compelled, even indirectly, to reveal 
their religious beliefs or lack thereof and found that the absence of a mark 
for ‘religion/ethics’ would be understood by any reasonable person as an 
indication that the pupil did not follow religious education classes, which 
were widely available, and that he was thus likely to be regarded as a person 
without religious beliefs. In the Court’s view, the fact of having no mark for 
‘religion/ethics’ inevitably had a specific connotation and distinguished the 
persons concerned from those who had a mark for the subject30. 
Interestingly,  the  Constitutional  Court  of  Poland  analyzed  the 
constitutionality of the Ordinance and dismissed t he arguments concerning 
the  risk  of  a  division  between  believers  and  non -believers.  The 
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Constitutional  Court's  judgment  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  any 
interested pupil would be able to follow a class in either of the two subjects 
concerned, and consequently there would always be a mark on the school 
report  for  ‘religion/ethics’.  However,  the  ECtHR  noticed  that  the 
Constitutional Court had overlooked the situation in which a pupil had no 
mark  for  ‘religion/ethics’  on  his/her  school  reports  because  the  schools 
could  not  organize  ethics  classes  despite  repeated  requests  from  his/her 
parents31.  
The situation could become even more problematic if participation in 
‘religion/ethics’  classes  are  graded,  and  marks  obtained  for  religious 
education class or ethics are included in the calculation of a grade point 
average. The aforementioned Ordinance of the Polish Minister of Education 
introduced a rule that marks received in religious education class or ethics 
would be included in the calculation of the average grade obtained by a 
pupil in a given school year and at the end of a given level of schooling.  
This  situation  has  already  been  examined  by  the  ECtHR,  which 
observed  that  the  above  rule  might  have  a  real  adverse  impact  on  the 
situation of pupils who could not, despite their wishes, attend a course in 
ethics. Such pupils would either find it more difficult to raise their grade 
point average as they could not attend the desired optional subject, or might 
feel pressured to attend a religion class against their conscience in order to 
improve their average32. 
Several scholars and practitioners expressed the view that in the 
Grzelak  case  the  Court  departed  from  its  practice  in  similar  cases,  e.g. 
Saniewski  v.  Poland  in  which  a  complaint  in  similar  situation  had  been 
declared  manifestly  ill-founded.  In  the  Court’s  view,  there  were  at  least 
three grounds that distinguished the Grzelak case from the Saniewski case. 
Firstly,  differently  from  Saniewski,  in  the  Grzelak  case  the  allegations 
concerned all the consecutive school reports of the applicant, including his 
leaving certificate for primary and lower secondary schools. Secondly, in 
the present case the Court examined the issues raised in the light of Article 
14 taken in conjunction with Article 9. Thirdly, the relevant new factor for 
the Court was the amended Ordinance of the Minister of Education of 13 
July  200733.  Dissenting  with  the  findings  of  the  Court,  Judge  D.  Thór 
Björgvinsson expressed the view that quantitative differences in the facts of 
the case cannot render the reasoning in the Saniewski case irrelevant to the 
facts of the Grzelak case. He could not support the view that the facts of the 
Grzelak case were different from those in the Saniewski case merely in that 
the impugned school reports covered all of the third applicant's primary and 
secondary schooling, whereas  in  the  Saniewski case only one report had 
been at issue34. In supporting this position, Judge A. Buyse noticed that it 
seemed rather odd that the Court after nine years simply took a different 
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position35. 
Another  example  is  the  recent   Appel-Irrgang  case  concerning 
mandatory ethics classes for pupils in grades 7 to 10, which the applicants 
considered  to  be  contrary  to  their  Protestant  belief.  Regarding  the 
applicants’  claims  that  the  ethics  classes  were  not  neutral,  the  Court 
observed  that  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Berlin  School  Act,  which 
envisaged  the  requirement  that  the  ethics  classes’  aim  was  to  examine 
fundamental questions of ethics independently of pupils’ cultural, ethnic and 
religious origins, meant that the classes were therefore in conformity with 
the principles of pluralism  and objectiveness  established by Article 2 of 
Protocol  No.  1.  Addressing  the  applicants’  complaint  that,  despite  the 
Christian tradition of Germany, the Christian religion was not adequately 
represented in the ethics course, the Court noted that it fell within a State’s 
margin of discretion to decide whether or not a school curriculum was, in 
view of the country’s tradition, to dedicate more attention to a particular 
religion and whether ethics should be taught in separate classes. As regards 
the applicants’ claims that the ethics course was contrary to their religious 
beliefs, the Court observed that neither the School Act nor the curriculum 
gave priority to one particular belief; moreover, nothing impeded the first 
applicant from continuing to attend the Protestant religion course offered by 
the school36. 
The third group of cases and activities are related to compulsory 
participation in classes of a certain type that, by their nature, have the 
potential for discussion, e.g. sexual education. In essence, these cases do not 
differ in argumentation from the cases concerning attendance at alternatives 
to religious classes, where the ECtHR employs the test of objectiveness and 
emphasizes the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the states in construction 
of the school curriculum. 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, which concerned 
the conscientious objection to sex education in school, was one of the first 
cases to be dealt before the ECtHR with reference to Article 2 Protocol No. 
1. In deciding the case in favor of the respondent government the Court 
proposed  a  restrictive  interpretation  of  parents’  rights  with  regard  to  the 
religious and philosophical orientation of their children's education37. The 
ECtHR concluded that attempts to warn pupils against phenomena the state 
viewed as disturbing, for example, the excessive frequency of births out of 
wedlock, induced abortions and venereal diseases, were very general in 
character  and  did  not  entail  an  overstepping  of the bounds  of what  a 
democratic State might regard as in the public in terest.  In  the  Court´s 
opinion the legislation in dispute did not attempt at indoctrination aimed at 
advocating a specific kind of sexual behavior and thus could not offend the 
applicants’ religious and philosophical convictions38.A recent complaint in 
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the Dojan and other v. Germany case was also rejected as manifestly ill-
founded as there was no indication that the classes and activities at issue had 
put into question the parents’ sexual education of their children based on 
their religious convictions. Neither had the school authorities manifested a 
preference for a particular religion or belief within those activities. The sex 
education classes, from which the applicants had requested exemption for 
their children, had aimed at the neutral transmission of knowledge about 
procreation,  contraception,  pregnancy  and  childbirth,  based  on  current 
scientific and educational standards. The goal of the theatre workshop had 
been  to  raise  awareness  of  sexual  abuse  of  children  with  a  view  to  its 
prevention.  The  carnival  celebrations  had  not  been  accompanied  by  any 
religious activities and the possibility of attending alternative activities had 
aimed to accommodate the moral and religious convictions of children and 
parents belonging to the Christian Evangelical Baptist community as far as 
possible. The Court underlined that the Convention did not guarantee the 
right not to be confronted with opinions that were opposed to one’s own 
convictions.  The  applicants  had  furthermore  been  free  to  educate  their 
children  after  school  and  at  weekends  in  conformity  with  their  religious 
convictions39. 
To conclude, the ECtHR’s findings in the Folgerø, Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin and Grzelak cases demonstrate that in practice states do not always 
comply with the requirement to ensure education consistent with religious 
convictions set forth in Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR. The 
curriculum of obligatory religious subjects is not always  conveyed in an 
objective,  critical  and  pluralistic  manner  and  states  fail  to  ensure  that 
existing  mechanisms  of  exemption  and  (or)  alternative  teaching  do  not 
oblige a person to reveal his/her belief or the fact that he is a non-believer, 
or that he/she does not  appear in a position from which it may inferred 
whether or not he/she has such beliefs. 
 
 
II.  DISPLAY OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
In 2010 the research department of BBVA, Spain's second-largest 
bank, carried out a study on issues regarding religious symbols in schools40. 
According to the study, 52.6% of those polled in 12 Eur opean Union 
Member  States  were  ‘opposed’  or  ‘totally  opposed’  to  the  use  of  the 
religious  garment  in  schools.  More  than  80%  of  Bulgarian  and  65%  of 
French respondents said they were opposed to veils. Opposition was lowest 
in  Poland  with  only  25.6%  against,  followed  by  Denmark  with  28.1% 
opposed. In contrast, 54.4% of those polled were in favour of classrooms 
displaying crucifixes. In Spain and Italy, two nations with a strong Roman 
Catholic tradition, support for the display of crucifixes in classrooms stood 
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at 69.9% and 49.3% respectively. Support for the display of crucifixes in 
classrooms shot up to 77% in Britain and 78.8% in Denmark41. 
A  comparative  analysis  of   the  legal  aspects  reveals  a  set  of 
regulations or prohibitions on wearing religious symbols in more than 25 
countries all over the world 42. There are different levels of regulation or 
prohibition on the wearing of religious symbols including constitutional  
provisions, legislative acts at the national level, regulations and mandatory 
directives  of  regional  or  local  authorities,  rules  in  public  or  private 
organizations or institutions (e.g. school rules) and court judgments43. 
For more than twenty years the  place of the Islamic headscarf in 
State education has been the subject of debate across Europe 44. In most 
European  countries,  the  debate  has  focused  mainly  on  primary  and 
secondary schools. However, in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Albania it has 
concerned not just the question of individual liberty, but also the political  
meaning of the Islamic headscarf. These are the only Member States of the 
Council of Europe to have introduced regulations on wearing the Islamic 
headscarf in universities45. Such strict regulation has influenced the volume 
of applications lodged with the Strasbourg Court against Turkey. 
It should be mentioned that the European Commission of Human 
Rights in its early case-law had decided that the requirement of submitting a 
photograph without headscarf to obtain a university certificate did not raise 
an  issue  under  the  freedom  of  religion  enshrined  in  Article  9  of  the 
Convention. The Commission dismissed the applications of  Karanduman46 
and Bulut47 on the grounds that the fact a secular university has regulations 
on  students’  dress  and  that  its  administrative  services  are  subject  to 
compliance with those regulations does not constitute an interference with 
the right to freedom of religion and belief.  
In contrast,  the ECtHR in  subsequent  case-law  departed from  the 
earlier  assessments  of  the  Commission  and  qualified  the  wearing  of 
headscarves as a religious practice protected by Article 9 of the Convention.  
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One of the best-known cases regarding the issue of headscarves in 
educational institutions is the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey48. Coming from 
a  traditional  family  of  practicing  Muslims,  Ms  Şahin  considered  it  her 
religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf. She was a fifth-year student at 
the  faculty  of  medicine  of  Istanbul  University  when  the  university 
authorities issued a circular declaring that students with beards and students 
wearing  the  Islamic  headscarf  would  be  refused  admission  to  lectures, 
courses  and  tutorials49.  Since  Ms  Şahin  continued  wearing  the  Islamic 
headscarf, she was refused access to the exam and the course; subsequently 
she was suspended from the university and pursued her studies in Austria. 
Ms Şahin lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining under 
Article 9 that she had been prohibited from wearing the Islamic headscarf at 
her university. The Grand Chamber proceeded on the assumption that the 
circular in issue, which set forth restrictions of place and manner on the 
right  to  wear  the  Islamic  headscarf  at  universities,  constituted  an 
interference with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion. However, the 
Court  considered  that  the  impugned  interference  primarily  pursued  the 
legitimate  aims  of  protecting  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  others  and  of 
protecting public order.  The ECtHR  held that there was  a legal  basis in 
Turkish  law  for  the  interference  with  Ms  Şahin’s  right  to  manifest  her 
religion, as the Turkish Constitutional Court had ruled before that wearing a 
headscarf at universities was in contravention of to the Constitution50. As to 
whether the interference was necessary, the Court noted that it was based in 
particular on the principles of secularism and equality. The Court considered 
that, ‘when examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish 
context, there had to be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a 
symbol, which was presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, 
may have on those who chose not to wear it.’51 The Court did not lose sight 
of the fact that there were extremist political movements in Turkey, which 
sought  to  impose  on  society  as  a  whole  their  religious  symbols  and 
conception of a society founded on religious precepts52. Finally, the Court 
concluded  that,  having  regard  to  the  Contracting  States’  margin  of 
appreciation,  the  interference  in  issue  was  justified  in  principle  and 
proportionate to the aims pursued, and could therefore be considered to have 
been ‘necessary in a democratic society’. It therefore found no violation of 
Article 9. 
The  judgment  of  the  Grand  Chamber  was  widely  discussed  and 
criticized53. Judge Tulkens in her dissenting opinion disagreed  with the 
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manner in which the principles of secularism and equality were applied and 
to the way they were interpreted in relation to the practice of wearing the 
headscarf54.  Judge Tulkens criticized that firstly , the judgment does not 
address the applicant’s argument – which the Government did not dispute – 
that she had no intention of calling the principle of secularism, a principle 
with  which  she  agreed,  into  question.  Secondly,  there  is  no  evidence  to 
show that the applicant, through her attitude, conduct or acts, contravened 
that principle. Lastly, the judgment makes no distinction between teachers 
and students (see the case of Dahlab). Regarding the principle of equality, 
Tulkens ponders as to whether there is a connection between the ban on 
wearing the headscarf and sexual equality55. Moreover, the majority of the 
Court did not even consider that excluding an adult woman from university  
was a peculiar path to achieving gender equality56. 
In all subsequent cases concerning the wearing of religious signs by 
students or teachers in public schools the Court used the same approach and 
reasoning as in the case of  Leyla Şahin. For instance, in the case of Köse 
and 93 others v. Turkey57 the ECtHR justified the ban on wearing Islamic 
headscarves  at  school.  The  Court  found  that  the  obligation  imposed  on 
pupils to wear a school uniform and not to cover their heads at school is a 
general rule applicable to all pupils irrespective of their religious beliefs. 
Consequently,  even  assuming  that  the  applicants’  right  to  manifest  their 
religion  has  been  interfered  with,  the  Court  found  no  appearance  of  a 
violation of Article 9 of the Convention. 
It should be mentioned that restrictions concerning the wearing of 
Islamic  headscarves  in  public  education  institutions  were  applicable  not 
only  to  students,  but  to  teachers  as  well.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of 
Kurtulmuş v. Turkey58 an associate professor at the Faculty of Economics of 
the University of Istanbul was deemed to have resigned from her post on the 
grounds that she had wilfully failed to  comply with  the Rules on Dress 
applicable to Staff in State Institutions, which prohibited female members of 
staff  from  wearing  the  headscarf  when  performing  their  duties  in 
educational institutions. The applicant submitted that the ban on her wearing 
a headscarf when teaching had violated her right guaranteed by Article 9 of 
the Convention to manifest her religion freely. The Court noted that the 
rules  on  dress  apply  equally  to  all  public  servants,  irrespective  of  their 
functions  or  religious  beliefs.  Considering  that  public  servants  act  as 
representatives of the State when they perform their duties, the rules require 
their  appearance  to  be  neutral  in  order  to  preserve  the  principle  of 
secularism and its corollary, the principle of a neutral public service. On this 
subject, the Court referred to the case of Vogt59 noting that a democratic 
State  may  be  entitled  to  require  public  servants  to  be  loyal  to  the 
constitutional  principles  on  which  it  was  founded  (as  mentioned  above, 
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secularism is one of Turkey's constitutional principles). The Court also took 
into account the margin of appreciation that had to be left to the States in 
determining  the  obligations  on  teachers  in  the  State  education  system 
depending on the level  of education concerned. Consequently, the Court 
found  that  the  impugned  interference  was  justified  in  principle  and 
proportionate to the aim pursued, and declared the application inadmissible. 
All  other  applications  against  Turkey60  regarding  the  wearing  of 
headscarves  when  performing  duties  in  educational  institutions  were 
declared inadmissible.  
In the case of Dahlab v. Switzerland61 the application was declared 
inadmissible  as  well,  but  the  reasoning  of  the  Court  was  different.  The 
applicant, a primary school teacher who had converted to Islam, complained 
of the school authorities’ decision to prohibit her from wearing a headscarf 
while teaching. She had previously worn a headscarf in school for a few 
years  without  causing  any  obvious  disturbance.  The  Court  declared  the 
application  inadmissible,  holding  that  the  measure  had  not  been 
unreasonable and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The Court accepted 
that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a ‘powerful external symbol’ 
such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience 
and religion of very young children (the pupils were aged between four and 
eight). The Court admitted that it cannot be denied outright that the wearing 
of  a  headscarf  might  have  some  kind  of  ‘proselytizing  effect’.  The 
Strasbourg Court noted that ‘it therefore appears difficult to reconcile the 
wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for 
others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils.’62 Accordingly, weighing 
the right of a teacher to manifest her religion against the need to protect 
pupils by preserving religious harmony, the Court considered that, in the 
circumstances of the case and having regard, above all, to the tender age of 
the children, the authorities did not exceed their margin of appreciation. 
France’s conception of secularism is the most rigidly defined, with 
strictly  enforced  policies  that  keep  religion  out  of  the  public  sphere63. 
Despite massive protests across the country in 2004 the French National 
Assembly  passed  the  Law  on  Secularity  and  Conspicuous  Religious 
Symbols in Schools. The law forbids pupils to wear any religious symbol in 
public primary (from 11 to 15 y.o.) and secondary schools (from 15 to 18 
y.o.). The ban does not concern private schools and universities. The law 
prohibits public school employees and  students from wearing conspicuous 
religious symbols, including the Islamic headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh 
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turban, and large Christian crosses.  However, the  Law does  not  prohibit 
more discreet symbols, such as necklaces with a cross, Star of David, or 
hand of Fatima. In order to enforce the law, the Minister of Education issued 
a circular specifying practical examples of ‘conspicuous’ symbols. The law 
and circular gave headmasters the power to decide whether particular attire 
was or was not acceptable, allowing them to refer to the 2004 law64. 
The law has caused outrage and prompted students and their parents 
to apply to the domestic courts, as well as to lodge applications with the 
Strasbourg Court. It should be mentioned that the applications submitted 
concerned not only Islamic headscarves, but Sikh turbans as well. The 2004 
Law  has  often  been  referred  to  a s  the  anti -Islamic  veil  Act,  but  the 
applications lodged demonstrate that the Law bans the wearing of any and 
all conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. After implementation, 
this policy was the subject of several applications against France lodg ed 
with the Strasbourg Court. In the cases of  Dogru65  and  Kervanci66  the 
applicants, both Muslims, were expelled from school for refusal to remove 
their  headscarves  during  physical  education  classes  despite  repeated 
requests  to  do  so  and  for  breaching  the  duty  of  assiduity  by  failing  to 
participate actively in those classes. The Court found no violation of Article 
9 in both cases, holding in particular that the conclusion reached by the 
national authorities that the wearing of a veil, such as the Islamic headscarf, 
was incompatible with sports classes for reasons of health or safety was not 
unreasonable. It accepted that the penalty imposed was the consequence of 
the  refusal  of  the  applicants  to  comply  with  the  rules  applicable  on  the 
school's premises – of which they had been properly informed – and not of 
their religious convictions, as they alleged. 
In 2008, six pupils lodged applications concerning their expulsion 
from school for wearing conspicuous symbols of religious affiliation. Four 
Muslim girls,67 who were wearing a headscarf or kerchief, and two boys, 68 
who were wearing a ‘keski’, an under-turban worn by Sikhs, were expelled 
from school for failure to comply with the Education Code, as they refused 
to  remove  the  offending  headwear.  In  these  cases  the  ECtHR  indirectly 
assessed  the  Law  on  Secularity  and  Conspicuous  Religious  Symbols  in 
Schools.  The  Court  declared  the  applications  inadmissible,  holding  in 
particular that the interference with the pupils’ freedom to manifest their 
religion was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting 
the rights and freedoms of others and of public order. As to the punishment 
of definitive expulsion, it was not disproportionate to the aims pursued as 
the  pupils  still  had  the  possibility  of  continuing  their  schooling  by 
correspondence courses. 
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Aside from Islamic headscarf issues, in its jurisprudence the ECtHR 
has had to deal with the problem of the display of other religious symbols in 
public educational institutions. For instance, in 2006, Ms Lautsi lodged an 
application69 regarding display of the crucifix in public school classrooms70. 
Ms Lautsi’s children attended a state school where all the classrooms had a 
crucifix  on  the  wall,  which  she  considered  contrary  to  the  principle  of 
secularism  by  which  she  wished  to  bring  up  her  children.  Following  a 
decision of the school’s governors to keep religious symbols in classrooms, 
Ms Lautsi brought administrative proceedings and complained in particular, 
without  success,  of  an  infringement  of  the  principle  of  secularism.  She 
complained before the Court that the display of the crucifix in the State 
school attended by her children was in breach of Article 9 and of Article 2 
of Protocol No. 1.  
The ECtHR Chamber acknowledged the crucifix was a ‘powerful 
external  symbol’71  and  held  that  the  display  of  such  symbols  in  the 
classrooms ‘may be emotionally disturbing for pupils of other religions or 
those who profess no religion.’72 The Court considered that the compulsory 
display of a symbol of a particular faith in classrooms restricts the right of 
parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions, and 
the right of schoolchildren to believe or not believe. Such restrictions are 
incompatible with the State’s duty to respect neutrality in the exercise of 
public authority, particularly in the field of education. 
The judgment of the Chamber was met with strong indignation and 
the  Government  of  Italy  asked  for  the  case  to  be  referred  to  the  Grand 
Chamber.  Several  European  Council  Member  States73,  including 
Lithuania74, intervened as third parties and submitted written briefs. 
The Grand Chamber concluded that the decision whether crucifixes 
should be present in State school classrooms is, in principle, a matter falling 
within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State. Moreover, the 
fact that there is no European consensus on the question of the presence of 
religious  symbols  in  State  schools  speaks  in  favour  of  th at  approach. 
Furthermore, a crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol, a of 
importance in the Court's view, particularly having regard to the principle of 
neutrality. It cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to 
that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities 75. The Court 
also  underlined  that  the  presence  of  crucifixes  is  not  associated  with 
compulsory teaching about Christianity and that Italy opens up the school 
environment in parallel to other religions (it was not forbidden for pupils to 
wear Islamic headscarves or other symbols or apparel having a religious 
connotation; alternative arrangements were possible to help schooling fit in 
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with non-majority religious practices, etc.). Finally, the Court observed that 
the applicant retained in full her right as a parent to enlighten and advise her 
children, to exercise in their regard her natural functions as educator and to 
guide them on a path in line with her own philosophical convictions. In its 
Grand  Chamber  judgment,  the  Court  found  no  violation  of  Article  2  of 
Protocol No. 1, and it held that no separate issue arose under Article 976, 
which led certain authors to conclude that that  ‘Islam was not compatible 
with the values of the Convention’77. 
The jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court raised a discussion about 
‘double standards’ applicable to different religions. In all cases regarding 
the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public educational institutions, the 
ECtHR justified the bans applied by a state on the grounds of the margin of 
appreciation  and  the  principles  of  secularism  and  neutrality  of  the 
educational institutions. However in the Crucifix case, the Court did not 
impose such an important role to the principle of secularism.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
1.  Although  the  majority  of  Member  States  of  the  Council  of 
Europe still provide religious  education classes  in  state schools, most of 
them offer exemption mechanisms or lessons in substitute subjects, or give 
pupils the choice of whether or not to sign up to a religious studies class in 
order  to  comply  with  the  prohibition  on  indoctrination.  However,  the 
ECtHR’s decisions in the Folgerø, Hasan and Eylem Zengin and Grzelak 
cases  indicate  that  the  legal  mechanisms  for  opting  out  of  confessional 
religious instruction or substitute subjects in place of compulsory religious 
education themselves do not guarantee that states in practice ensure that the 
information and knowledge in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, 
critical and pluralistic manner, and that the individuals seeking to benefit 
from the exemptions or alternatives are not obliged to reveal their belief or 
the fact that they are non-believers, and do not find themselves in a position 
from which it may be inferred whether or not they have such beliefs. 
2.  The jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court in  respect of the 
display of religious symbols in educational institutions raised a discussion 
about ‘double standards’ applicable to Islam and Christianity. In all cases 
regarding  the  wearing  in  public  educational  institutions  of  an  Islamic 
headscarf, which was qualified by the Court as ‘powerful external symbol’, 
the ECtHR justified the bans applied by States on the grounds of the margin 
of  appreciation  and  the  principles  of  secularism  and  neutrality  of 
educational  institutions.  However,  in  the  Lautsi  case,  the  Court  did  not 
ascribe  such  an  important  role  to  the  principle  of  secularism  and 
concentrated on the proportionality of the limitation. Due to the essentially 
passive nature of the symbol and the tolerance of Italy towards the use of 
the  symbols  of  other  religions  or  beliefs,  the  Court  also  approved  the 
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exposure of a crucifix as a matter falling within the margin of appreciation 
of the state. 